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JUSTICE FOR TYRANTS: INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT WARRANTS FOR 
GADDAFI REGIME CRIMES 
John J. Liolos* 
Abstract: The Arab Spring was a period of great transition in the Middle 
East and North Africa, when people in many nations united in protest 
against their oppressive and tyrannical governments. In February 2011, 
the Libyan people filled their city streets in peaceful demonstrations 
against Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. Attempting to quell the dissent, the 
Gaddafi regime allegedly engaged in a systematic campaign of violence 
against the dissidents. These attacks escalated into a full-fledged civil war, 
triggering United Nations intervention to protect civilians. In response to 
the Gaddafi regime’s attacks on civilians, the UN Security Council passed a 
resolution referring the alleged human rights abuses to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) for prosecution. This Comment explores the effect 
of the warrant, the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction over the matter, and 
argues that both Libyan and ICC officials should be instrumental in trying 
the accused members of the Gaddafi regime. 
Introduction 
 On May 16, 2011, the prosecutor at the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, filed warrants for the arrest of 
Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and 
Abdullah al-Senussi for alleged human rights abuses in connection with 
the 2011 Libyan uprising.1 The prosecution accused these three men of 
planning and implementing “widespread and systematic attacks against 
a civilian population, in particular demonstrators and alleged dissi-
dents.”2 Using the Libyan armed forces as agents, the men allegedly 
                                                                                                                      
* John J. Liolos is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
1 Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11, Prosecutor’s Applica-
tion Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minya Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, para. 2 (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter Prosecutor’s War-
rant Application], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1073503.pdf. The 
names of the accused often vary in spelling among the sources. Throughout this piece the 
names remain consistent with their spelling in the Prosecutor’s Warrant Application. 
2 Id. 
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detained, tortured, and killed hundreds of civilians in an attempt to 
suppress the growing popular challenge to Gaddafi’s authoritarian 
rule.3 Judge Sanji Monageng of the ICC issued warrants for their arrest 
and ordered the men to stand trial at the Hague for human rights 
abuses pursuant to its prosecutorial power.4 
 Part I of this Comment provides a brief background on the Gad-
dafi government, the 2011 civilian uprising and its connection to the 
Arab Spring, and the alleged human rights abuses of the Gaddafi re-
gime. Part II focuses on the ICC’s jurisdictional powers and its ability to 
legitimately and effectively prosecute crimes against humanity, while 
also respecting domestic criminal jurisdiction. Part III analyzes the ap-
propriateness of the ICC as the proper tribunal for prosecuting the ac-
cused. This section explores the available alternative options for prose-
cution, such as the post-revolution Libyan courts or a hybrid 
prosecution in Libya involving both ICC and Libyan officials. It will also 
demonstrate that the ICC is the proper organization to undertake the 
prosecution, although the Hague may not be the ideal location. Lastly, 
this section also explores the prudence of the ICC issuing the warrant 
during Gaddafi’s reign and the deepening civil war. 
I. Background 
A. A Pattern of Abuse: Gaddafi and His Government 
 Muammar Gaddafi seized power in Libya in a bloodless military 
coup on September 1, 1969, replacing the ruling Sanusi Monarchy.5 
Gaddafi assumed a key position in the Revolutionary Command Coun-
cil, and his powers gradually coalesced from revolutionary leader to 
authoritarian autocrat.6 Gaddafi consolidated his power by capitalizing 
                                                                                                                      
3 Id. paras. 12, 14, 17, 20, 27; Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Qaddafi’s Grip on 
the Capital Tightens as Revolt Grows, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 2011, at A1; David D. Kirkpatrick & 
Mona El-Naggar, Qaddafi’s Grip Falters as His Forces Take on Protesters, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 
2011, at A1. 
4 Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11, Decision on the Prose-
cutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minya Gad-
dafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdulla Al-Senussi, para. 41 ( June 27, 2011) [hereinafter 
Decision on Prosceutor’s Warrant Application], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/icc 
docs/doc/doc1099314.pdf. The Rome Statute of July 17, 1998. established the ICC’s pow-
er to prosecute crimes against humanity. Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2178 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter 
Rome Statute]. 
5 Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya 73, 79 (2006). 
6 Geoff Simons, Libya: The Struggle for Survival 161, 194 (1993). 
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on the nation’s oil reserves, and propagandized his revolutionary and 
social philosophy through the dissemination of his Green Book.7 With 
his control solidified, Gaddafi ruled Libya continuously from 1969 until 
his overthrow and death in 2011.8 
                                                                                                                     
 Under Gaddafi, the Libyan government allegedly committed nu-
merous human rights abuses and state-sponsored acts of terrorism, in-
cluding the infamous 1988 Lockerbie bombing.9 In response to these 
abuses and criminal acts, Gaddafi’s regime faced international reprisals 
throughout his reign, including both military intervention and eco-
nomic sanctions.10 Though Gaddafi appeared to relax his belligerent 
attitude when he abandoned the Libyan nuclear program under inter-
national pressure in 200311, his response to the recent popular uprising 
demonstrated his continued disregard for human rights.12 
 Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, one of Muammar Gaddafi’s sons, was a key 
figure in the inner circle of the regime.13 After studying at the London 
School of Economics, he became an unofficial but instrumental pres-
ence within the government.14 Saif al-Islam was also thought to enter-
tain progressive, western-friendly ideals, and to be attempting to trans-
form Libya into a thriving democratic state.15 
 
7 John Wright, Libya: A Modern History 243 (1982); see George Tremlett, Gadaffi: 
The Desert Mystic 233–36 (1993). The Green Book is Gaddafi’s revolutionary manifesto 
containing his philosophies on social and political order. Vandewalle, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
8 See Neil MacFarquhar, An Erratic Leader, Brutal and Defiant to the End, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
21, 2011, at A16. 
9 Yehudit Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics 43–45 (2008). 
10 Id. at 32, 45–46. 
11 See id. at 63–64. 
12 Vivienne Walt, The Capture of Gaddafi’s Son: The Reformer Who Refused to Reform, Time, 
Nov. 19, 2011, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2099890,00.html;  
Defiant Gaddafi Orders Revolt Crushed, Sydney Morning Herald, Feb. 23, 2011, available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/world/defiant-gaddafi-orders-revolt-crushed-20110223-1b4bo.html. 
13 Inside Gaddafi’s Inner Circle, Aljazeera (Feb. 27, 2011), http://english.aljazeera. 
net/news/africa/2011/02/2011227192852808945.html. 
14 See Timothy Garton Ash, Dr. Saif Gaddafi’s LSE Thesis Makes a Case for the Action That 
Crushed Him, Guardian (U.K.), Nov. 30, 2011, at 41 (discussing Saif al-Islam’s relationship 
with the London School of Economics); Libya to Sign Free Trade Accord with EU Soon: Saif, 
Reuters (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/20/us-libya-europe-
idUSLK6924420080820 (providing an example Saif al-Islam’s influence in the govern-
ment). 
15 See Luis Martinez, The Libyan Paradox 7 (2007); Countdown to Reforms in Libya 
Begins: Saif, Reuters (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/21/us-
libya-saif-reform-idUSLK22324520080821; Gaddafi Son Calls for Democracy, BBC News (Sept. 
26, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8258617.stm. 
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 Saif al-Islam’s reformist attitude changed abruptly in response to 
the growing protests against his father’s regime.16 As tensions escalated, 
Saif al-Islam adamantly supported his father’s right to power, dismissed 
the protestors as rabble, and warned of bloody civil war if the demon-
strations continued.17 Gaddafi’s brother-in-law and the head of Libyan 
intelligence, Abdulla al-Senussi, was also allegedly instrumental in the 
forceful response against demonstrators.18 Thus, the ICC charged both 
Saif al-Islam and al-Senussi with human rights violations in connection 
with the government’s response to the uprising.19 
B. Arab Spring Rising: The Libyan Chapter 
 The recent Arab Spring effectively began on December 17, 2010, 
when an unemployed Tunisian, desperately frustrated with economic 
and social conditions in his nation, set fire to himself in the street in an 
act of protest.20 The flames embodied a frustration felt by millions of 
similar citizens, galvanizing political actors and sparking widespread 
demonstrations throughout Tunisia and the wider Arab world.21 After 
civilian protests in Tunisia and Egypt evolved into successful popular 
revolutions, many Libyans also began to voice their frustrations and 
stand in resistance to the Gaddafi regime.22 Unlike the Tunisian and 
Egyptian governments, who responded to the peoples’ calls for reform 
by stepping down, the Gaddafi regime reacted violently to the protests 
in an attempt to maintain power.23 
 By late February 2011, the popular protests in Libya became wide-
spread and prominent; in response, the Gaddafi regime escalated its 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Walt, supra note 12; Gaddafi’s Son in Civil War Warning, ABC News (Feb. 21, 2011), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011–02–21/gaddafis-son-in-civil-war-warning/1951396. 
17 Gaddafi’s Son in Civil War Warning, Aljazeera (Feb, 21 2011,) http://www.aljazeera. 
com/news/africa/2011/02/2011220232725966251.html. 
18 Ian Black, Gaddafi’s Confidant Is Abdullah Senussi, a Brutal Right-Hand Man, Guard-
ian (U.K.), Feb. 22, 2011, at 5. 
19 Prosecutor’s Warrant Application, supra note 1, para. 2. 
20 See Robert F. Worth, How a Single Match Can Ignite a Revolution, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 
2011, at WK4. The “Arab Spring” refers to the widespread social and political awakening 
across the Middle East that inspired protests and revolutions, including civil war in Libya. 
See Sarah Joseph, Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights, 35 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 145, 157–58, 162–63 (2012). 
21 See Worth, supra note 20; Joseph, supra note 20, at 157–58, 162–63. 
22 See Joseph, supra note 20, at 157–58, 162–63; Egypt-Inspired Protests Spread to Libya, 
CBS News (Feb. 16, 2011,) http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/02/16/501364/main 
20032155.shtml. 
23 See Joseph, supra note 20, at 157–58, 162–63; Kirkpatrick & El-Naggar, supra note 3. 
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brutal crackdown on protestors.24 One group of independent human 
rights activists, concerned by the increasing death toll, confirmed more 
220 deaths by February 21.25 There were further incidents of violence, 
including allegations that Gaddafi forces used rape as a weapon of fear 
and intimidation.26 In response, the ICC began an investigation into 
these alleged crimes against humanity.27 
II. Discussion 
A. Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
 The ICC was established at the Hague in 1998, after the United 
Nations ratified the Rome Statute.28 Article 5 of the Rome Statute 
enumerates the court’s jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, genocide, and the crime of aggression.29 The ICC theoretically 
has jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes when they are committed.30 
To limit the court’s interference in domestic prosecutions, however, the 
drafters of the Rome Statute erected jurisdictional hurdles that must be 
cleared before the ICC can hear a case.31 
 To admit a case, the court must find that it meets the jurisdictional 
requirements under Article 19.32 Ordinarily, only the states that are sig-
natories to the Rome Statute are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
ICC.33 Libya is one of the United Nations member states that has not 
ratified the Rome Statute, and therefore is generally outside the juris-
diction of the court.34 
                                                                                                                     
 The Rome Statute provides other means for the court to obtain 
jurisdiction, however, including a referral from the United Nations Se-
 
24 Kirkpatrick & El-Naggar, supra note 3. 
25 Id. 
26 Ed Pilkington et al., Gaddafi Faces New ICC Charges for Using Rape as a Weapon in Con-
flict, Guardian (U.K.), June 8, 2011, at 23. 
27 Marlise Simons, International Criminal Court Begins Libya Inquiry, N.Y. Times (Mar. 3, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/world/africa/04hague.html. 
28 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 1. 
29 Id. art. 5. 
30 Remigius Oraeki Chibueze, The International Criminal Court: Bottlenecks to Individual 
Criminal Liability in the Rome Statute, 12 Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comp. L. 185, 202–03 (2006). 
31 Id. 
32 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 19. 
33 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 
59–60 (3d ed. 2007). 
34 See Michael P. Scharf, Results of the Rome Conference for an International Criminal Court, 
ASIL Insights (Aug. 1998), http://www.asil.org/insigh23.cfm. 
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curity Council.35 Article 13(b) authorizes the court to exercise jurisdic-
tion if the Security Council determines a listed crime has been commit-
ted and refers the issue to the court.36 Because non-parties are not 
bound to the terms of the treaty, there is no true enforcement mecha-
nism to the Security Council’s recommendation.37 Nevertheless, Article 
12(3) allows non-member states to accept the court’s jurisdiction and 
cooperate in the matter, if they so choose.38 Accordingly, on February 
26, 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1970 
that unanimously referred the Gaddafi matter to the ICC.39 The resolu-
tion conceded that it is not binding on Libya, but it did strongly en-
courage Libya to cooperate with the court.40 Thus, the resolution effec-
tively granted the ICC jurisdiction over the matter if Libya decided to 
consent and cooperate, which is a point of some contention.41 
 Even if Libya opts to cooperate with the investigation, though, ICC 
prosecution of the Gaddafi regime faces a second jurisdictional hurdle if 
Libya decides to prosecute the regime in domestic courts.42 The drafters 
of the Rome Statute sought to limit the ICC’s power in matters where 
the individual state’s internal judicial system has the capacity to handle 
the matter adequately.43 The ICC’s jurisdiction is expressly intended to 
be “complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”44 As such, Article 
17 states that the court shall determine a case is admissible only where 
the state with original jurisdiction is “unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution.”45 To determine such inabil-
ity, the court is bound to consider whether the state’s judicial system is 
unable to “obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony” 
resulting from a “total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its na-
                                                                                                                      
35 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 13. 
36 Id. art. 13(b). 
37 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
38 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 12(3). 
39 S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011); see also Press Release, 
Security Council, In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on 
Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters, U.N. Press 
Release SC/10187 (Feb. 26, 2011) [hereinafter UN Press Release on Resolution 1970] 
(stating the referral was unanimous). 
40 S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 39, ¶ 3. 
41 Vivienne Walt, Why Gaddafi’s Legal Fate Remains Contentious, Time, Sept. 1, 2011, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2091277,00.html. 
42 See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 17. 
43 Schabas, supra note 33, at 59–60. 
44 Rome Statute, supra note 4, pmbl. 
45 Id. art. 17(1)(a). 
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tional judicial system.”46 After years of authoritarian dominance and 
corruption, the Libyan judiciary is generally considered to be weak.47 
However, the newly established ruling National Transitional Council 
(NTC)48 is working to develop a legitimate justice system and may desire 
the responsibility of prosecuting its former leader.49 Thus, this aspect of 
the issue of the ICC’s jurisdiction hinges on the present capacity of the 
Libyan courts to administer justice effectively.50 
B. The Prosecutor’s Burden: Obtaining the Warrant 
 Once a viable argument for the court’s jurisdiction has been estab-
lished, the ICC prosecutor may initiate an investigation into the alleged 
crimes if “the information available to the [p]rosecutor provides a rea-
sonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the court 
has been or is being committed.”51 In this case, jurisdiction was argua-
bly established through the passage of UN Resolution 1970 on Febru-
ary 15, 2011.52 Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo53 subsequently began the 
official investigation into the alleged crimes on March 3.54 
  During an ICC investigation, the prosecutor must meet certain 
procedural thresholds to comport with the fundamental due process 
rights mandated by the drafters of the Rome Statute.55 One such pro-
tection is the “reasonable basis” threshold.56 Here, the offenses are 
“crimes against humanity,”57 defined by the Rome Statute as any num-
ber of enumerated acts, such as murder, torture, and rape “committed 
                                                                                                                      
46 Id. art. 17(3). 
47 Vandewalle, supra note 5, at 191; Wright, supra note 7, at 80. 
48 See Ian Black, Libyan Rebels Win International Recognition as Country’s Leaders, Guardian 
(U.K.), July 15, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/15/libyan-rebels- 
international-recognition-leaders (recognizing the NTC as the acting government of Libya). 
49 David Kaye, What to Do with Qaddafi, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 2011, at A29. 
50 See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 17. 
51 Id. art. 53(1)(a). 
52 S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 39, ¶ 5. 
53 Louis Moreno-Ocampo is a former Argentine prosecutor who was unanimously 
elected as the first prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in 2003. Press Release, 
Int’l Criminal Court, Election of the Prosecutor (Apr. 24, 2003), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press and media/press releases/2003/election of the 
prosecutor. 
54 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor to Open an Investigation in Lib-
ya (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/ 
press%20releases/statement%20020311. 
55 T. Markus Funk, Victims’ Rights and Advocacy at the International Criminal 
Court 53 (2010). 
56 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 53(1)(a). 
57 See id. art. 7; Kirkpatrick & El-Naggar, supra note 3. 
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as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack.”58 The accused must have 
performed a criminal act within the court’s jurisdiction in order for the 
prosecutor to have a “reasonable basis.”59 
 To this end, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo collected evidence indi-
cating Gaddafi and his associates perpetrated crimes against humanity.60 
The evidence collected included a plan to suppress demonstrations 
through “the use of lethal force against demonstrators and alleged dis-
sidents,” accounts of snipers strategically placed to fire on crowds of ci-
vilians leaving mosques, and incidents of torture and abuse.61 Direct 
evidence of these abuses was also corroborated through the “scale, 
scope and duration of the attacks.”62 On the basis of this evidence, the 
ICC concluded that the prosecutor had met his “reasonable basis” bur-
den, and granted the warrant on June 27, 2011.63 
                                                                                                                     
III. Analysis 
A. Potential Challenge to ICC Jurisdiction 
 With Libya’s cooperation, the ICC appears to meet the jurisdic-
tional requirements to prosecute Saif al-Islam and al-Senussi, but some 
Libyans have expressed a desire to try the accused in domestic courts.64 
Libya is not bound to cooperate with the ICC, and the NTC may con-
test jurisdiction if it establishes a viable justice system before the prose-
cutions begin.65 Because of the ICC’s commitment to the principle of 
complementarity, national prosecutions take precedence over ICC 
prosecutions, provided the domestic institutions are willing and able to 
undertake the complex proceedings.66 Neither the principle of com-
plementarity, nor the threshold of the domestic court’s prosecutorial 
 
58 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7. 
59 Id. arts. 5, 53(1)(a). 
60 See Prosecutor’s Warrant Application, supra note 1, paras. 12, 14, 15, 27. 
61 Id. paras. 12, 20, 27. 
62 Id. para. 12. 
63 Decision on Prosecutor’s Warrant Application, supra note 4, para. 41. 
64 See Kaye, supra note 49; Walt, supra note 41. 
65 See Schabas, supra note 33, at 59–60. 
66 Rome Statute, supra note 4, pmbl.; Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Com-
plementairity in International Criminal Law: Origin, Development and Practice 
158–59 (2008). 
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ability is explicitly defined in the Rome Statute.67 This sets the stage for 
a flashpoint of jurisdictional contention.68 
 The NTC may contest ICC jurisdiction on the grounds that it is not 
bound by the Rome Statute and is willing and able to try Saif al-Islam 
and al-Senussi on Libyan soil.69 Some have advanced the view that this 
scenario is the only one that will allow Libyans to feel vindicated, and to 
legitimize the new popular government.70 Furthermore, trying Saif al-
Islam and al-Senussi in Libya would allow the prosecution of other al-
leged criminal acts against the people during Gaddafi’s reign that were 
not included in the warrant and that the ICC has not pursued.71 
 Should Libya choose to prosecute Saif al-Islam and al-Senussi do-
mestically rather than to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC, the ICC 
may nevertheless attempt to retain jurisdiction by arguing that Libya is 
“unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”72 To 
support this position, the ICC may conclude that the Libyan courts are 
not yet sufficiently established as an independent judiciary after dec-
ades of authoritarian control.73 Under Gaddafi, the Libyan courts 
lacked independence and were subject to his supremacy and influ-
ence.74 And before Gadaffi was in power, his predecessors exercised 
similar control over the judiciary.75 Therefore, the Libyan legal system 
has long been subject to authoritarian dominance without the freedom 
to develop as a just and independent force.76 With such a history of 
corruption, there is reason to believe the new Libyan government may 
struggle to establish an effective court system capable of guaranteeing a 
fair trial for former regime officials so soon after the revolution.77 
 Yet, these arguments address neither the problem of trying the 
accused in courts previously dominated by the Gaddafi government, 
nor the due process concerns inherent in post-revolutionary regime 
                                                                                                                      
67 Benjamin N. Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court 77 (2008). 
68 See Kaye, supra note 49. 
69 See Schabas, supra note 33, at 59–60; Kaye, supra note 49. 
70 Charles Adeogun-Phillips, Prosecuting Gaddafi: Ensuring Justice in Libya, Jurist (Sept. 
20, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/09/charles-adeogun-phillips-libya.php. 
71 See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 5; Ronen, supra note 9, at 43–45 (referencing Lib-
ya’s Lockerbie Bombing involvement); Evan Hill, Libya Survivor Describes 1996 Prison Massacre, 
Aljazeera (Oct. 21, 2011), http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/09/ 
20119223521462487.html (discussing alleged al-Senussi massacre). 
72 See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 17(1)(a). 
73 See id.; Vandewalle, supra note 5, at 191; Wright, supra note 7, at 80. 
74 Vandewalle, supra note 5, at 191; Wright, supra note 7, at 80. 
75 Wright, supra note 7, at 80. 
76 Vandewalle, supra note 5, at 191; Wright, supra note 7, at 80. 
77 See Vandewalle, supra note 5, at 191; Wright, supra note 7, at 80. 
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prosecutions.78 With reports surfacing that allege NTC mistreatment of 
common prisoners of war, there is reason to fear that similar disregard 
for due process would befall Saif al-Islam and al-Senussi.79 Additionally, 
questions over the manner of Gaddafi’s death, and accusations that it 
was an extra-judicial execution, exacerbate skepticism of Libya’s ability 
to guarantee a legitimate prosecution and the due process rights of the 
accused.80 If Saif al-Islam or al-Senussi are captured alive, there is a 
valid concern that they will neither be safe in the custody of Libyan 
military authorities, nor receive the due process to which they are enti-
tled.81 Without a reliable and independent Libyan judicial system, it is 
unclear that a wholly domestic prosecution would achieve real justice.82 
oners of war.88 Despite these concerns, since the NTC acquired control 
                                                                                                                     
 In order to address both the Libyan people’s demands for justice 
and to palliate the concerns of critics, some suggest the trial should be 
held in Libya but supervised by the ICC.83 Such a cooperative prosecu-
tion is not unprecedented in international criminal cases.84 Holding an 
ICC trial in Libya would ensure due process for the accused and provide 
Libyans just and well-orchestrated criminal proceedings on their home 
soil.85 This experience would offer Libyan citizens a sense of vindica-
tion, and establish a paradigm of legitimate criminal justice for the 
courts.86 One concern with this model is the capacity of the NTC to en-
sure security and safety during the trial.87 This is especially disconcerting 
in light of Gaddafi’s controversial death and the treatment of NTC pris-
 
78 See Vandewalle, supra note 5, at 191; Wright, supra note 7, at 80; Ian Black, Libyan 




1, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian 
oce
2011, at A4. 
s, New Mechanisms for the Enforcement of International Humani-
taria , 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 934, 937–48 (2001). 
ossiter & Kareem Fahim, Revolution Won, Top Libyan Official Vows a New 
and s State, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2011, at A10; Stephen & Harding, supra note 79. 
monstrating due process violations, torture, and similar concerns for prisoners). 
79 See Chris Stephen & Luke Harding, Amnesty Finds Widespread Use of Torture by Libyan 
Militias, Guardian (U.K.), Feb. 16, 2012, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/w
2/feb/16/amnesty-widespread-torture-libyan-militias (discussing the torture of common 
prisoners). 
80 See George Grant, Saif Gaddafi Should Be Put on Trial in Libya, Telegraph (U.K.), 
Nov. 22, 201
an/libya/8906893/Saif-Gaddafi-should-be-put-on-trial-in-Libya.html (noting Gaddafi’s 
extra-judicial execution). 
81 See Adam Nossiter & Rick Gladstone, In Libya, Massacre Site Is Cleaned Up, Not Investi-
gated, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 
82 See Kaye, supra note 49. 
83 Id. 
84 See, e.g., Daryl A. Mundi
n Law
85 See Kaye, supra note 49. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. 
88 See Adam N
 More Piou
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of the country, conditions have come to appear suitable for a prosecu-
tion.89 
 In all, it seems that a Libyan domestic prosecution poses risks to 
due process, but it is unclear that the ICC would have jurisdiction if 
Libya chooses not to cooperate.90 A trial at the Hague would probably 
be the most efficient, safe, and effective means of prosecution. Never-
theless, an ICC trial in Libya could satisfy all due process concerns of 
the accord, while also vindicating the Libyan people’s demands for jus-
tice and setting a benchmark for judicial independence and integrity in 
the Libyan transition to democracy.91 
B. Prudential Aspects of the ICC Warrant 
 Even if legal jurisdiction is established, the ICC still faces certain 
political concerns regarding the prudence of issuing its arrest warrant 
for Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah al-Senussi.92 
For one, because the vast majority of the ICC’s cases to date involve Af-
rican nations and their leaders, some criticize the ICC as merely a tool 
of Western imperial powers specifically for use against African na-
tions.93 Scholars point out that because the ICC primarily prosecutes 
African leaders, it risks being labeled as a “selective prosecutor,” provid-
ing justice “only for those countries too weak to resist it.”94 
 To the contrary, most African nations have themselves voluntarily 
referred cases to the ICC, a fact that support’s the court’s legitimacy as 
a forum of international justice.95 In the present matter, the UN Secu-
rity Council unanimously referred this issue to the court in Resolution 
1970, displaying international consensus extending beyond western 
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nations.96 Additionally, members of the new Libyan government have 
applauded the efforts of the international community to back their 
revolution.97 Despite concerns about the limited application of ICC 
jurisdiction to African nations, it is clear that the action taken against 
Gaddafi has widespread international support and legitimacy.98 
 A second prudential criticism levied against the ICC is the timeli-
rrant may have been a theoretical 
                                                                                                                     
ness of the warrant.99 Critics contend that the ICC should not have 
granted the warrant for Gaddafi and his associates while he still held 
significant power.100 This arguably incentivized Gaddafi to entrench 
himself and perpetuate the violence, rather than to investigate exit op-
tions involving political compromise.101 To this effect, the African Un-
ion released a declaration imploring its member states not to cooperate 
with the ICC warrant because it “seriously complicates the efforts at 
finding a negotiated political solution to the crisis.”102 Nevertheless, UN 
Security Council Resolution 1970 urged the cooperation of all UN 
member states, making a political solution involving exile and asylum 
quite difficult.103 Even if Gaddafi had sought amnesty in another nation 
the harboring country would have faced heavy international pressure 
to extradite the former dictator.104 
 Although the issuance of the wa
disincentive to negotiate, it is clear Gaddafi intended to crush the re-
bellion and was not willing to talk either before or immediately after 
the warrant was granted.105 Both Gaddafi’s rhetoric and actions rein-
forced the fact that he was determined to maintain power at any cost 
and would not be deterred.106 Even under the force of NATO air-
 
96 See UN Press Release on Resolution 1970, supra note 39. 
97 See Black, supra note 48; India Backs UN Sanctions Against Libya, Times of India, Feb. 
27, /India-backs-UN-sanctions-
aga
r. 29, 2011, at 5. 
ican Union, Decision on the Situation in Libya, para. 6, Assembly/AU/Dec. 
385(XVII) ( July 1, 2011); Booth, supra note 99. 
trick 
& E is Own Words, Guardian (U.K.), Oct. 20, 
201
, supra note 3; Muammar Gaddafi in His Own Words, supra note 105. 
2011, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india
inst-Libya/articleshow/7585933.cms. 
98 See Goldstone & Smith, supra note 94, at 113; UN Press Release on Resolution 
1970, supra note 39. 





103 See UN Press Release on Resolution 1970, supra note 39; Booth, supra note 98. 
104 See S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 39, ¶ 5. 
105 See Prosecutor’s Warrant Application, supra note 1, ¶¶ 12, 14, 17, 20, 27; Kirkpa
l Naggar, supra note 3; Muammar Gaddafi in H
1, at 4. 
106 See Prosecutor’s Warrant Application, supra note 1, ¶¶ 12, 14, 17, 20, 27; Fahim & 
Kirkpatrick
2012] ICC Warrants for Gaddafi Regime Crimes 601 
strikes, a retreating front line, high-level government ministers defect-
ing, and the capture of Tripoli by NTC forces, Gaddafi continued to 
use his military forces against his own people.107 It was only after his 
defeat appeared inevitable that reports emerged of his potential will-
ingness to negotiate.108 Gaddafi defiantly held out to the last, reduced 
to a small area of a few square blocks, until his violent demise.109 Fur-
thermore, the ICC warrant demonstrated growing international sup-
port for the cause of the NTC’s fighters, which is an important consid-
eration in evaluating the prudence of the warrant.110 Thus, the 
warrant’s benefits outweighed any adverse effects, given Gaddafi’s clear 
intention to violently crush the rebellion both before and after it was 
issued.111 
Conclusion 
 For over forty years, Muammar Gaddafi oppressed the people of 
Libya as dictator, until he was deposed in a popular uprising during the 
Arab Spring in 2011. During peaceful political demonstrations, Gad-
dafi’s government allegedly repressed the protests through the system-
atic use of lethal force against civilians. In response to these acts, the 
United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution condemning the 
violence and referring the Gaddafi government’s alleged crimes against 
humanity to the International Criminal Court. Based on this authority 
and the existing evidence, the prosecutor of the ICC applied for a war-
rant which the court subsequently granted. If the new Libyan govern-
ment chooses to cooperate, the ICC would certainly have jurisdiction. 
However, Libya is not a party to the Rome Statute, so it would not be 
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction if it chose not to cooperate. The ICC 
may contend that Libya is unable to try the matter effectively because it 
lacks the institutions and a functional judiciary capable of ensuring due 
process. There may be some credence to this argument, but it may not 
be 
                
sufficient to outweigh an uncooperative Libya because it is not 
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bound by the Statute. An ICC trial in Libya is certainly a viable solution 
to serve both parties’ interests of achieving a just trial, doling out pun-
ishment for crimes if the defendants are found guilty, and allowing the 
Libyans to observe with these patriotic and democratic experiences on 
their home soil. In all, the ICC warrant for Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam, and 
al-Senussi was warranted by the circumstances surrounding the Gaddafi 
regime’s brutal oppression of the popular uprising, and was a service to 
international justice and the Libyan people. 
